Practice Areas

Employment Case Summaries

Employee unable to prove gross negligence without evidence of prior injuries: Employee worked for a manufacturer of pre-engineered building systems. He received two weeks of general training, and then began to work a "roll coater machine." The procedures to clean the machine had been used and followed by other employees for years without incident, and the employee adopted the same procedures. These procedures differed from the cleaning procedure recommended in the machine’s manual. The employee was severely injured while cleaning the machine, and subsequently sued several supervisory and management co-employees for gross negligence. The employee claimed that he was taught to clean the machine in a manner inconsistent with the procedure recommended by the manual. Defendants filed for summary judgment, which was granted by the District Court. On appeal, the Court’s analysis turned on whether the employee could prove as a matter of law that the Defendants knew his injury was "a probable, as opposed to a possible, result." The court held that the employee was unable to prove this element because there had been no history of prior injuries as a result of utilizing the long-standing procedures, and the Court affirmed the decision of the District Court.

Suit dismissed for failure to name correct Defendants: Plaintiff was arrested on May 14, 2008 and incarcerated in the Dubuque County Jail, where the plaintiff attempted suicide. On May 10, 2010—four days before the applicable statute of limitations would have run—Plaintiff filed suit against "Dubuque County Sheriff’s Office" and the "Dubuque County Jail." The Petition was served to the Sheriff on June 22, 2010. Defendants answered and filed for dismissal because the named Defendants were not capable of being sued, the Defendant could not amend the petition because any amendment did not "relate back" to the original petition, and suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The District Court dismissed the action. On appeal, the Court noted that notice was not served on the Sheriff until June 22, 2010, which was after the statute of limitations had run. As a result, the amended petition naming the correct Defendants did not relate back to the original petition under Rule 1.402(5) of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court affirmed the District Court, and the case was dismissed.

Subcontractor had a general duty of care when working with other contractors. Plaintiff was working for Sioux, which is an ethanol plant that was involved in an expansion project. Sioux hired Schoon to work on electrical cables, and Schoon hired Nikkel to hook up electrical cables to terminal on switchgears. The plaintiff was part of a team that was tasked with modifying the switchgears. Unknown to the plaintiff, electricity was flowing through the switchgears. When he tried to work on one, he was electrocuted and injured. The plaintiff sued Nikkel alleging that Nikkel "failed to inform [the plaintiff] the switchgear had power." Nikkel filed a motion for summary judgment alleging he had no duty to the plaintiff, which was granted. In granting summary judgment, the district court held that Nikkel did not maintain control over the work, and therefore owed no duty to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Court reversed and noted that Nikkel had a general duty of care in charging the electrical line to the switchgear box. This standard is consistent with the general standard contained in the Third Restatement, and is not an "exceptional case," where the Court is permitted to modify the general duty of care.

Termination two weeks after incident was not a "past act of misconduct" and unemployment benefits denied. At the company in question, the phone system was used instead of a traditional time card. A co-employee asked the employee to log into her phone system to make it appear she had checked in when she was not yet in the office. The employee attempted to do this, and did not report the request to the employer. On December 31, 2009, employee's supervisor found out about this incident. The employee was interviewed on January 4, 2010, and she was re-interviewed about the incident on January 8, 2010. Human Resources instructed employee's supervisor to terminate her on January 15, 2010, and she was ultimately terminated on January 19, 2010. In a claim for unemployment benefits, benefits were initially awarded, but this decision was overturned by the ALJ who concluded that the employee was terminated for a current act of misconduct. The decision of the ALJ was confirmed, as the court noted that the period between learning of the misconduct and termination was not unreasonable.

Termination of employee and denial of unemployment benefits upheld after employee stole "wasted soup." An employee for a convenience store removed two-day old "wasted" soup from the store and placed it in the garbage. She then immediately transferred it to her car to take home to feed to her dog. When her employer found out, she was terminated due to a policy in the handbook which stated that the employees were not to remove any company property, including "damaged and outdated items." Unemployment benefits were contested due to misconduct. At hearing, it was undisputed that she had signed the handbook and was present at training, that discussed the topic, the prior year. The Administrative Law Judge found that she had engaged in misconduct, which was appealed and affirmed by the Employment Appeals Board and later by the District Court. On Appeal yet again, the employee argued that the soup was "garbage, abandoned property" and showed no intent to harm her employer. The prior decisions were upheld, and the Court held that the employee was properly fired for misconduct.

Commissioner finds compensable injury when petition was filed six years after first seeking treatment. An employee of Harmony House was terminated on February 28, 2008. Following her termination, the claimant sought legal advice concerning a potential discrimination claim, at which point the claimant was advised she may have sustained a compensable work-related injury. The claimant first sought treatment regarding knee pain in February of 2002, and continued to seek treatment for several years. She was ultimately referred to an orthopedic surgeon in 2005, and underwent a total knee arthroplasty in October of the same year. At no time during the treatment was the knee condition attributed to her work.

The Deputy found a compensable injury based on the "discovery rule" and determined that the claimant did not realize that her work and knee condition were related until after her termination. In affirming the decision, the Court stated that "the question of whether the claimant knew, or should have known, of the nature, seriousness, and probably compensability of her injury is a question of fact to be determined by the commissioner." The court continued, that although there was some evidence that would support an earlier injury date, the proper consideration is whether the evidence supports the decision made, not whether it supports a different decision.

N.1-225/10-1718
ABCM CORPORATION and CCMSI, Petitioners-Appellants, vs. MELISSA V. MANNING, Respondent-Appellee.

South Dakota statute of limitations for negligence of municipalities does not apply to a police officer's actions that arose in the scope of his employment. A South Dakota case where a police officer ran a red light and struck the plaintiff's vehicle while responding to an emergency call. The plaintiff filed suit three years later. South Dakota statute requires a negligence action against a municipality to be brought within two years. The claim was against the defendant in his personal capacity, so the defendant argued that the statute still applied because he was in the scope of his employment as a police officer when the accident occurred, and that the claim is time-barred. The circuit court granted summary judgment to defendant, stating that the claim is subject to the statute of limitations as applied to municipalities. The Court ultimately reversed the decision of the circuit court, holding that the omission of "municipal employees" in the statute was persuasive, and "the mere fact that [defendant's] allegedly negligent acts occurred during the scope of his employment does not include him within the term "municipality.""

Salzer v. Barff, 792 N.W.2d 177 (S.D. 2010)

Waitress fails to prove that her employer discriminated against her due to her pregnancy:
Plaintiff was a waitress for Employer. She contends she was laid off due to her pregnancy and denied reemployment after the child was born. The employer contends that the Plaintiff voluntarily quit her employment. The Iowa Civil Rights Act prevents an employer from firing an employee because of her sex or pregnancy. To prove a case of pregnancy discrimination, the Employee must demonstrate that: (1) she was pregnant; (2) she was qualified for her position; and (3) her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. In this case, the court determined that the Plaintiff had not established that she was terminated due to her pregnancy. Ash v. Aliu, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 23 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010).

Camera in bathroom can constitute an invasion of employee's privacy rights:
Employer placed surveillance cameras in the bathroom which were not always operational. The right to privacy can be invaded by unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. Under this theory, one who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Even though the images from the surveillance camera were not high quality or consistent, there was enough evidence for a court to determine that the employee's privacy rights were invaded. Koeppel v. Speirs, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 25 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010).

Employee was discriminated against because she did not wear dresses or makeup:
The employee alleged that she lost a job she had done well, solely because of unlawful sex stereotyping. The employee had a history of good performance at the employer. The employee had no prior disciplinary record and had received two merit based pay raises. The court found that an employer who discriminated against women because they did not wear dresses or makeup, was engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. Iowa 2010).